The aim of our article is to provide arguments for a poly-contextual and dynamic approach to information security risk culture. We consider the correlation of memes as DNA (DeoxyriboNucleic Acid) of the mind with knowledge and the organizational context. Our approach is interpretivist, reflective and dialectic (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2011) . It seeks to overcome the limits of knowledge induced by the highly mathematical models that are featured in specialized literature and often taken over in software applications. Yet we have to consider the subjectivism of the information that we process (Von Bayer, 2004) . Depending on the country or the region, we can notice that there are discrepancies between our own perceptions and the perceptions of our fellows. Human behaviour adjusts depending on our own experiences that are also specific to the environment in which we live (Lorenz, 1969). Can actual information security risk assessment models provide objective, sci-entific information on a wide range of social and technological risks? Can indi-viduals develop unique and precise judgments that can be limited only to math-ematic forms and calculus? "Risk does not exist 'out there', independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured" (Slovic,1992). As early as the 1950s opera-tional risk theoreticians stated that risk cannot be defined beyond human per-ceptions (Rappaport, 1953).
Introduction: Data Deluge and a Consequent Hype -Big Data
In building our arguments we start from opinion expressed by Joseph Schumpeter: "what counts ...is not the Yes or No that sums up the facts and arguments but those facts and arguments themselves... Analysis, whether economic or other, never yields more than a statement about the tendencies present in an observable pattern. And these never tell us what will happen to the pattern but only what would happen if they continued to act as they have been acting in the time interval covered by our observation and if no other factors intruded. 'Inevitability ' or 'necessity' can never mean more than this. ... The process of social life is a function of so many variables many of which are not amenable to anything like measurement that even mere diagnosis of a given state of things becomes a doubtful matter quite apart from the formidable sources of error that open up as soon as we attempt prognosis" (Schumpeter, 1942) . The paper is structured as follows. In section two we present a brief literature re-view dedicated on risk perception and the research method that we use. In section three we present as examples a standard and a framework well used by IT practitio-ners and state them also practical problems. Section four discusses the problem of memes. Our proposal is presented in sector five. In section six we bring a discussion of our findings and in section seven we make our conclusions. The research methodology is interpretive. We use such approaches because from a positivist perspective the observer and the subject of the observation should be sepa-rated. But information technology is part of a social system: the enterprise that cannot exist separately from human beings. The scope of our research is to start a debate on the factors affecting the risk culture. As we shall try to demonstrate information security risk assessment is based on the professional assessor's perception which depends on the environment in which he or she was trained and where he or she developed. Our research method is the oversim-plified tetraedic schema of trial and error elimination (Popper, 1994) .
Literature review and research method
In this section, we start from the fact that research in risk perception is conducted in real situation and cannot be based on positivist approaches that come from exact sciences. Information security is tied to technology while risk perception is a human characteristic. Organisations are not autonomous systems. Information security risk assessment, as it is presented in specialized literature, supposes predictability. Yet predictions start from the current state of the analyzed system. However, not all systems are predictable because we are not always in a position that makes observation possible (Maturana and Varela, 1998) . In this case, we cannot know correctly, what we should know so that we could make predictive statements about the system, even though we might try to use mathematic tools. Karl Popper defines scientific determinism as "the doctrine that the structure of the world is such that any event can be rationally predicted, with any desired degree of precision, if we are given a sufficiently precise description of past events, together with all the laws of nature." (Popper, 1982) We can notice in Popper's definition that an event's predictability depend on the detailed knowledge of the past and of all laws of nature. Who holds this knowledge? According to Hawking (Hawking, 1995) , Laplace's vision of scientific determinism, involving knowing the positions and speeds of the particles in the universe, at one instant of time was seriously undermined by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle that states a fundamental limit on the accuracy with which certain pairs of physical properties can be simultaneously known. Consequently, any discussion about the security risks of information systems should not overlook the fact that it is quite difficult to perform an objective information security risk assessment as long as we have already been affected by the society in which we live, by the system that we analyze and the knowledge that we have. This is, in fact, the first effect of any system: it diminishes human capacity to evaluate its effects on us. Technological determinism represents the effect resulting from the combination of the technical and social systems, through which relations between machines and their users are established and ways in which technologies can be used or that will be developed later are institutionalized (Menzies, 1989) . If we consider all these aspects, technology represents more than a collection of tools from among which we can select the one that best suits the task that we have to perform or that we shall use as basis to develop other instruments or methods of risk assessment. Yet we cannot overlook the philosophical and psychological aspects of technology in relation to itself or in relation to the society to which it belongs. In this case, we have to deal with the second effect that derives from technological determinism: not only is the current state of a technology determined in what our future choices are concerned, but it influences our intellectual and emotional response to the current social, technical and economical problems. Leveraging behavioral science leads to clear improvements and offers the potential for significant increases in the effectiveness of cyber security (Pfleegera and Caputo, 2012) . Risk analysis and risk evaluation processes have their limitations, when security incidents occur, they emerge in a context, and their rarity and even their uniqueness give rise to unpredictable threats (Spagnoletti and Resca, 2008) . Risk assessment is not an automatic process but one based on thinking, a decision making process. However, human thought is circumscribed in two models: experiential and rational (Epstein, 1994) . Alhakami and Slovic find that people minds confound risk and benefit and this confounding is linked to a person's overall evaluation of an activity or technology (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994) . Even when people know which quantitative dimension is relevant, they are influence by other dimensions (Fischhoff et al., 1978) . One of the foundational works on the flaws of human reasoning concludes that there are there heuristics that are employed in making judgments under uncertainty: representativeness, availability of instances or scenarios and adjustment from an anchor (Kahneman et al.,1982) . Moreover, people react to the prospect of risk at two levels: they evaluate the risk cognitively and they react to it emotionally (Loewenstein et al., 2001 ). People's perceptions and attitudes on risk are determined by the variety of quantitative and qualitative characteristics (Slovic, 1987) and often they have intuitive knowledge that they can effectively apply without being aware of the principles that are involved (Epstein, 1994) . A common element of these studies indicates that not probabilities but other characteristics are important determinants of how human beings "calculated risks". The conclusion of the psychological studies is that peoples do not follow the principles of probability theory in judging the likelihood of uncertain events (Kahneman et al.,1982) . In our attempt to answer the question if we can identify the limit between science (in our case, risk assessment models) and practical validation, we consider three perspectives in our research:
Consistency of the theory: absence of contradictions and the pragmatics of the theory;
Testing: checking the truth value, inconsistence or abandon; Dynamics of the theory: fecundity or capacity to solve all or a large part of the problems that emerged in practice.
ISO 27005 and Risk IT Framework
We will construct our arguments starting from ISO 27005 definitions and ISACA Risk IT Framework. According to ISO Guide 73 risk is effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO Guide 73:2002) . There are six notes about this definition:
• An effect is a deviation from the expected -positive and/or negative; • Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, information security, and environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process);
• Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events and consequences, or a combination of these. • Information security risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the con-sequences of an information security event and the associated likelihood of occur-rence;
• Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its consequence, or likelihood;
• Information security risk is associated with the potential that threats will exploit vulnerabilities of an information asset or group of information assets and thereby cause harm to an organization.
Regarding the risk treatment options the same standard states that the options should be considered taking into account:
• How risk is perceived by affected parties; • The most appropriate ways to communicate to those parties; • We remark that the standard makes a single reference to risk perception, in the case of risk treatment options. Moreover, the examples presented in Annex E, are based on probability / likelihood determined subjectively. In reality, we cannot use statistical probability even if we had historical data because we have no information about their representativeness. If, for example, we know that last year, in our organization was 25000 DoS (Denial of Services) attacks, we do not know which is the size of the population from which the sample belongs. Therefore, we will calculate subjective probabilities.
The Risk IT framework definitions are compatible with the COSO ERM defini-tions (which are equivalent to the ISO 31000 definition in guide 73):
• Risk appetite -the broad-based amount of risk a company or other entity is willing to accept in pursuit of its mission,
• Risk tolerance -the acceptable variation relative to the achievement of an objec-tive Risk appetite can be defined in practice in terms of combinations of frequency and magnitude of a risk. Risk IT framework makes no reference to risk perception but bring into question risk culture: the set of shared values and beliefs that governs attitudes towards risk-taking, care and integrity, and determines how openly risks and losses are reported and discussed (Risk IT Framework, 2009) . But risk appetite depends on risk perception and our brain does not perceive objects in isolation.
Unlike the ISO standard, Risk IT framework introduces the concept of risk culture that includes behavior towards taking risk; behavior towards following policy; behavior towards negative outcomes. The subject is not detailed.
A report of Australian Government -Department of Defence analyse in depth the human factors that influence behaviour in relation with information security. The report concludes that personality factors and cognitive styles contribute to differences in risk perception (Parsons et al., 2010) .
Memes: Information replicator for risk
A large part of the research dedicated to information system security risk assess-ment focuses more on technical aspects and overlooks the social, cultural and knowledge context in which these risks are manifested (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001) , Hence, information system risk security assessment methods also overlook the dy-namic character of human culture (Borodzicz, 2005) . But the dynamism of culture precedes the dynamism of technology and, consequently, the way in which the information system of an organisation operates is circumscribed by two types of situations that the human mind perceives: possible (real), and impossible. The possibility pertains to situations or facts that may exist at a certain moment, but that have not manifested themselves yet because of the conditions of the internal or external environment of an organisation. Given the subjective nature of human beings, the possibility should be strictly related to the capacity of the human being to transform the impossible into the possible (real). Things are impossible because of the limits to knowledge that human beings inherently have. This is why, the possibility or the impossibility of the occurrence of a certain event should be analysed from the viewpoint of its occurrence probability and of the mental attitude of the analyst (the moral hazard or the morality risk). Moral hazard emerges in any risk, but unfortunately it cannot be quantified because "security differs from other types of risk in aiming to protect systems, organizations and society from those with an intention to commit harm" (Borodzicz, 2005) .
Memetics is based on Darwinian evolutionism and it is validated by a scientific theory that unifies biology, psychology, and cognitive science. Twenty first century scientists apply evolutionism to the way in which the mind functions, to the way in which the human being functions and evolves, and to the way in which cultural pro-gress is achieved (Brodie, 2009) .
Biologist Richard Dawkins from Oxford University (Dawkins, 1990) first proposed the concept of meme. Since then, scientific literature defines memes as block units of knowledge; internal representations of knowledge; patterns of knowledge that exist in our own brain or outside it (Dennett, 1991), (Durham, 1991) , (Wilkins, 1998) and (Hofstadter, 1999) .
Brodie calls memes the"virus of the mind" because they are easily transmitted from one person to another and they influence human behavior (Brodie, 2009). Just like genes ensure survival of the species, memes ensure survival of culture, tradition or customs. In other words, memes are information replicators. But replicated information may contain errors because the lack of proofs for errors must not be taken for the lack of errors. Because replicators can be reproduced in different quantities, they are subject to natural selection (Heylighen and Chielens, 2009 ).
Human personality is more the result of infection with memes which are taken in through contact with the environment, and not the result of systematic learning. On the level of the universe of the mind, memetics is analogue to genetics which studies the same issues about genes in the universe of biology. We can find a synthesis of the literature that deals with this concept and its evolution in (Blackmore, 2001) .
In order to reach our purpose for this article, we are first interested in how memes are transmitted. Whereas genes are transmitted through sexual cells, memes are transmitted via communication. Moreover, if the genes are transmitted from one generation to the other (vertically), memes can be transmitted vertically as well as horizontally (within the same generation). Thus memes reach the brain through repetition/learning, association and cognitive dissonance.
For instance, through the mental association of an event connected with survival in the case of a natural disaster and an ordinary event such as the damaging of the electricity supplying source, the former event will be absorbed much easier by the brain of the risk assessor. Through cognitive dissonance a contradiction is created between two events, which the brain tries to solve. The conclusion will represent a meme.
Coming back to information security, most quantitative models of risk assessment consider that people behave according to well defined rules. Mathematic formalisms omit the interactions between the processes for which risks are assessed and especial-ly the mental processes that the professional assessor performs.
Polycontextual and dynamic approach to risk culture
Siponen presents an analysis of the traditional IS security approaches (Siponen, 2005) . The polycontextual and dynamic approach in the current study starts from the Business Model for Information Security (BMIS), a model developed by ISACA, as a busi-ness-oriented approach to managing information security (Fig.1). http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/BMIS/Pages/Business-Model-for-Information-Security.aspx) We learn and we develop by changing our system of convictions and by changing our memetic programming (Brodie, 2009 ). In our research we selected BMIS because we con-sider that information system security risks can be circumscribed to the four compo-nents: people, technology, organization and process. According to (Furnell and Thomson, 2009) people are very often perceived as an obstacle rather an asset for information security. The question that we wish to address is the following: is the assessor's reasoning process influenced by the given context?
The inter-dynamic connexions between the four components represent the ele-ments based on which we propose a set of variables that group together memes ac-cording to the categories that have a direct influence on the security risk assessment process. The identified memes -without being exhaustive -, are grouped according to the typology suggested by (Langrish, 1999) : recipemes, selectemes and explanemes. From our point of view the typology corresponds to the classification done by (Brodie, 2009) , who divides memes in: distinctions, strategies, and associations (Fig. 2) . Recipemes are competing ideas of how to do things. Selectemes are competing ideas of betterness. Providing the mental environment in which other memes compete for selection. Explanemes are competing ideas that are used in answering questions about why things work, work better or don't work.
Figure 2 seeks to demonstrate that the behavior of the human resource that under-lies any social construction results from the mental programming that he or she gained throughout his or her development. Any action that is not instinctive is dictated by memetic inheritance. In their professional evolution, humans receive a certain education, develop in a certain geographical area, in a society of a certain degree of development, choose a certain profession and depending on all these factors, they acquire certain experiences. Every human being has unique knowledge and unique perceptions.
In the case of information security risk assessment, the models used are circum-scribed to memetic models. A risk assessment model depends on polycontextual environmental variables (memes) and it cannot be represented by using only mathematic formalism. Security risk assessment is an evolving process that cannot be captured by an entropic model because evolution is a scientific model of the way in which things become more complex, while entropy describes the way in which things become more simple (Brodie, 2009) .
Can deterrence theory diminish risks? We know that IS scholars have used deter-rence theory to predict user behaviours as IS security variables. But according to (D'Arcy and Herath, 2011) literature review suggests an uneven and often contradictory picture regarding the influence of sanctions and deterrence theory in general in the IS security context. Even though it will be proven that there is an influence of this theory, memes will still foreground human behavior.
A further argument comes from Keynes and Akerlof (Keynes,1936) , (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009 ). First, "spiritus animalis" foregrounds relations between ambiguity and human uncertainty. Second, humans tend to consider only the nominal value of things when they have to made decisions. The behaviour in the presence of visceral cues would be more ''impulsive,'' (less sensitive to risk information), than behavior in the absence of visceral cues (Ditto et al., 2006) and .
We suggest a mental exercise starting from the definition of risk: combination of the probability of an event and its consequences. If we cannot identify a consequence, does it mean that we cannot speak about risks? It is only human knowledge and cognitive inferences that can decide if an event has consequences or not. However, why don't we also ask what is the use of a process or of an action? Can uncertainty be quantified without having a safety culture (Martin and Siehl, 1983) ?
Any model features a certain relative inadequacy when it is generalised.
Disscusion
Our research does not result in a deterministic and holistic solution because infor-mation systems are sociotechnical and involve a large number of factors and varia-bles. As long as the cultural component is hard to evaluate, ethnocentrism manifests itself in all types of behaviour, including in research, thus reaching a false sense of superiority. The contribution of this article consists in presenting the perspectives from which information security risk culture should be viewed and modeled (to the extent that this is possible).
Scientists' obligation is to work with what has been scientifically proven (Barrow, 1998) . Most times risks are not treated as a result of mathematical calculus but via the assessment of alternatives. Does not the economic crisis that started in [2007] [2008] prove that apart from mathematical models, something else is needed in risk assessment? For instance, one thing that is needed is the elimination of the illusion of the certainty of the prediction of any type of event.
Conclusion
First, the knowledge and the understanding of internal and external risks that can have an impact on the security of information systems, as well as the provision that these risks are managed in an optimum manner, cannot be limited to mathematic patterns. Irrespective of the name that is associated to the methods and patterns of assessment in the field-specific literature and in practice (ENISA Technical Department, 2006) , the context in which the assessment takes place and the knowledge that the professional assessor is endowed with are essential.
Second, risk cannot be viewed as a future event, with a certain probability of occurrence, by omitting the factors that ultimately influence the identification of probabilities and consequences. The choice of a model of (quantitative or qualitative) security risk assessment is given by memes. Yet this choice generates, in its turn, another risk: dependence on a model (Ferson et al., 2004) . This dependence is static, most events being "unknown unknown" (Taleb, 2010) . A weak risk management approach is effectively the biggest risk in organization (Hubbard, 2009) .
Third, the responsibility to ensure the security of information systems does not fall on one person only. In any organisation it is ensured by different roles in parallel: human resources, business function management, business continuity management, individual users etc. These roles involve people of different personalities, abilities, knowledge, and character. Human knowledge is not a simple object to which a value could be associated.
Fourth, we agree with (Maturana and Varela, 1998) : knowledge of knowledge compels us to adopt an attitude of permanent vigilance against the temptation of certainty and to recognize that certainty is not a proof of truth. Each of us sees the world differently and there are things in this world that cannot be quantified numerically/in terms of their value. Not yet. And even though they could be, the results of quantitative risk assessment are not reproducible as laboratory experiments are.
